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Introduction to the new life science industries 12
The new molecular life sciences have transformed a range of R&D-driven industries over 13 the past two decades, particularly in pharmaceuticals and agriculture. Both industries are 14 susceptible to "technological shocks" as new scientific knowledge and path-breaking 15 technologies broaden the spectrum of options for R&D and strategic management. The 16 complexity of the life sciences, and the different implications of biotechnology and 17 genomics for various parts of the R&D process, have created distributed innovation 18 systems and company networks in both sectors [1] [2] [3] . Firm strategy is shaped by robust, 19 though ever-changing, multi-layered and sometimes cumbersome regulatory systems that 20 are located outside the core innovation system, but which continue to influence 21 innovation at all times [4] . The success of multinational companies depends on a 22 continuous flow of new, innovative products with clear routes to market and established, 23 well-understood value systems. In pharmaceuticals, these have traditionally been small-24 molecule blockbuster products in core therapeutic franchises. Similarly, until the early 25 1990s, the dominant innovation model in the agricultural sector was global commodity 26 crops. In both industries, new technologies, such as high-throughput screening and 27 combinatorial chemistry, were embraced enthusiastically and brought product and 28 process advances in the identification, validation and formulation of new chemicals. 29 Rapid developments in the life sciences in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought 30 new opportunities and challenges for both industries, and continue to do so today. Just as 31 conventional product pipelines began to reach maturity, the new life sciences offered 32 hope of developing radically different types of product and markets. For the 33 pharmaceutical industry, recombinant proteins in the 1980s, monoclonal antibodies in the 34 1990s, and more recently stem cells, emerged as potential alternatives to blockbuster 35 small molecule drugs. Similarly, in the late 1980s GM crops presented the agro-chemical 36 industry with a radically new product portfolio disruptive to its prevailing R&D strategy. 37 However, the life sciences also brought new competition for incumbent firms as smaller 38 biotechnology companies with unique knowledge and expertise emerged. The path-39 breaking nature of the new technologies and products, many with unknown risk profiles 40 and without established routes to market, engender new regulatory hurdles that increase 41 the cost of R&D and generate uncertainty. 42
Our aim is to explore the evolution of the pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology 43 industries in the context of emerging life science innovation and new regulatory systems, 44 and suggest key lessons for future governance. We use the term agro-biotechnology in 45 this article to refer specifically to those agrochemical companies that linked with seed 46 companies to produce GM crops. We highlight the opportunities and challenges of 47 managing transition from maturity to a new high-value-added innovation model subject 48 to high regulatory hurdles and hope to spur a broader discussion about the systemic 49 aspects of R&D-driven industries and the role of regulation in shaping innovation. 50 51
From maturity to value-added innovation: challenges and opportunities 52
Developments in the life sciences have reshaped the pharmaceutical and agro-53 biotechnological industries. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the largest multinational 54 chemical firms had relatively integrated and complementary R&D strategies. Indeed, 55 some had both health and agriculture divisions. This period of innovative activity was 56 characterised by a series of mergers and acquisitions as multinationals sought "buy-in" to 57 new technology platforms [5] . 58 However, this "combination strategy" ended around the late 1990s. The two 59 sectors separated their capabilities and pursued autonomous strategies of innovation 60 through both merger and acquisition activities and strategic alliances. It became clear to 61 senior managers that synergy between agriculture and pharmaceuticals at the discovery-62 level was profitable only when both sectors were primarily interested in the source of 63 chemical novelty, but not in the "gene" area [5, 6] . Functional genomics could benefit 64 both sectors, but disparities in profit margins [7] and technological and economic 65 differences [8] did not make for long-term positive synergies. 66
67
Responding to the "problem of maturity" 68
In the early 1990s, both sectors struggled as conventional chemical-based products 69 reached maturity and R&D pipelines narrowed. By "maturity", we mean molecules had 70 already been developed for easy targets and were now off-patent, so no longer generating 71 large profits, and industry was concerned about the long-term sustainability of 72 conventional blockbuster R&D models. Both sectors searched for new R&D options. In 73 agriculture, strategic planning focused on 'a combination of chemical and biotechnology 74 developments with varying degrees of synergistic interaction' [9,10]. Companies 75 embraced diversity in technological development [11] . As product pipelines matured, 76 three distinct company strategies emerged to exploit the new life science trajectory (Box 77 1). 78
Innovation strategies are cumulatively dependent on a company's past history 79 [12, 13] , and the resources and 'dynamic capabilities' of a firm influence its patterns of 80 innovation [13] . The innovation strategies of agro-biotechnology companies in the 1980s 81 and 1990s varied, depending on their existing strengths in product development and 82 technology trajectories along with their overall vision for the future. GM crops were a 83 disruptive technology for most multi-national agro-biotechnology companies still 84 benefiting from patented agro-chemical products, but were attractive to firms that had 85 reached the limits of small molecule chemical innovation. 86
In pharmaceuticals, the maturity problem and desire to move to high-value-added 87 biotechnology-based products was also a driver of organisational change and 88 restructuring. Traditionally, pharmaceutical R&D was a serendipitous activity in which 89 chemical compounds were randomly screened and tested on known disease targets. Lead 90 molecules were then optimised to produce lead candidates for further development. Both the pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology industries have been forced to 108 confront the challenges and opportunities of the molecular life science paradigm in the 109 context of maturity of conventional product pipelines. For pharma, life science 110 investment and attendant organisational restructuring has been primarily a response to the 111 challenges of therapeutic innovation, rather than a revolutionary, pro-active attempt to 112 fully embrace a life science-based innovation trajectory. Innovation spending in agro-113 biotechnology has moved towards GM seed technology, with total agro-biotechnology 114 R&D expected to equal agrochemicals in 2009 [26] . 115
Our research on both the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries has shown 116 that multinationals do not always share common objectives and strategies; rather, strategy 117 is an evolutionary process based on firms' unique histories, internal competencies and 118 routines, market position and future expectations [2, 9, 14] . The long-lead times in 119 pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology R&D mean that the precise benefits of any 120 restructuring initiative and implantation of new strategy take time to emerge. 121 Nevertheless, product innovation and company strategy is also determined by the 122 regulatory environment and it is to this important aspect that we now turn. 123
124

Regulation and its impact on innovation strategy and product development 125
Regulation has significant impact on R&D-driven industries, such as pharmaceuticals and 126 agro-biotechnology, and partly explains the long product lead times that distinguish these 127 industries from most others, although even without formal regulation firms would still 128 need to invest time and resource to establish product safety. Nevertheless Innovation that is "path-breaking" for one company or sector may of course be 167 "path-dependent" for another. For example, it was not inevitable that GM crops would be 168 developed and marketed only by what were then agro-chemical firms, for which they 169 were clearly path-breaking; GM crops disrupted the prevailing innovation model, 170 simultaneously impacting company R&D strategy (i.e. requiring a shift from chemistry-171 to biology-based development and production systems), markets (i.e. seed markets are 172 very different from pesticide markets), and regulatory systems.
In the 1980s and early 173 1990s, it was equally likely that food and seed companies would develop the technology. 174
For these companies, the technology was path-dependent [4, 30] . 175
A complex set of interactions between policymakers at European, U.S. and 176 international levels, as well as among the agro-biotechnology, food production and 177 distribution, and seed industry sectors, contributed to the overall framing of GM. It would 178 have been beneficial to guide policymakers to adopt the regulatory system that applied to 179 the industry sector for which the technology was path-dependent; in this case the seed and efficacy, the question is whether the conventional regulations that apply to small 205 molecule blockbuster products, and more conventional biologics, are appropriate for stem 206 cells; especially when they may be a barrier to innovation. Whilst there are myths and 207 uncertainties about the regulatory gaps and barriers to regenerative medicine [32], there is 208 as yet no clear route to market for many small companies developing the technology and 209 regulatory guidelines can be vague and ambiguous. Lessons from the regulation of GM 210 crops may help us to develop regulatory processes for stem cells that encourage, rather 211 than impede, those companies best placed to innovate in this area. 212 213
Conclusion: key lessons for new "smart" approaches to regulation 214
Regulatory systems tend to evolve incrementally over long time periods, which make 215 them susceptible to becoming inflexible and out-of-step with the latest innovations and 216 technologies. Furthermore, regulation can become so complex that modifications to one 217 set of regulations have unforeseen consequences for other parts of the regulatory system 218 and for the innovation community. However, de novo creation of path-breaking 219 regulation for path-breaking technology also poses difficulties and challenges and could 220 just as easily discourage innovation as encourage it. 221 The life sciences continue to be of high strategic importance to both developed 226 and emerging economies and shape many innovative industries. But life science 227 innovation is largely dominated by a relatively small number of multinational companies, 228 and regulatory systems often serve to maintain the status quo. Regulation is an 229 insurmountable barrier to many small start-up companies with innovative ideas that 230 challenge prevailing orthodoxy. Whilst it would of course be inappropriate to lower 231 safety and efficacy standards for life science-based products, the development of a 232 smarter approach to regulation, which we have outlined, could bring about a more 233 favourable climate for innovation. 234 235
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The authors acknowledge the support of the ESRC Innogen Centre (Grant Number RES-237 145-28-0002) in providing the funds for various research projects on which the opinions 238 stated in this article is based. We also thank the editor and two anonymous referees for 239 large multinationals (Amgen, Genzyme, Genentech and Geron); but later growth in 399 biotechnology has been slow. Today the chances of a small biotechnology firm becoming 400 a large, independent company appears bleak given the high barriers to entry. 401 402 5. There are now more partnerships between public and private institutes to pool 403 information and attempt delivery of niche products, including orphan drugs and products 404 vaccines for developing countries. Nevertheless, the dominant model continues to rely on 405 "blockbuster drugs" rather than targeted drugs for niche markets. Despite the promises of 406 the life sciences, multinational pharmaceutical firms did not seek to fully transform 407 themselves into biotechnology companies; in contrast to some of the agro-biotechnology 408 companies like Monsanto. Indeed, there has not yet been a pharmaceutical equivalent to 409 Monsanto. 410 411 include a focus on 'substantial equivalence'. If the new technology or product is 458 substantially equivalent to an existing product, path-breaking regulation should 459 not be necessary. 460 (6) In considering which regulatory precedent is most appropriate for a new 461 technology, a useful approach would be to prioritise the regulatory system for the 462 industry sector for which the innovation is path-dependent rather than path-463 breaking. This would ensure the sector better positioned to quickly take forward 464 the product to market is encouraged to do so. 465 466
